AGENAVerify a chain-of-title certificate
Paste an Agena certificate, or upload a certificate (.json) or a delivered glTF (.gltf), and this page checks it against the live ledger. Nothing you submit is stored, and no account is needed.
What the three answers mean
The certificate you gave us re-derives against the ledger: the manifest signature checks out, the sealed content still hashes to the value on the certificate, the asset.sealed event it names is really there, and the hash chain is unbroken up to now.
The glTF you gave us carries a provenance manifest, that manifest is on the ledger, and it matches the sealed one field for field. What is deliberately not claimed: that the file is byte-identical to the sealed content. Delivered files are watermarked for each licensee, so their bytes differ by design — that is how a leaked file is traced back. Provenance is the claim, and provenance verifies.
The reasons are listed in full. A public preview lands here on purpose: previews are trimmed, downsampled and watermarked, and carry no manifest, so there is nothing for us to verify. So does a file from another library, and so does a certificate whose asset has been altered.
This page never touches the motion fingerprint registry. Verification answers “does the ledger say this happened”. Identifying an unlabelled file is a different question with different privacy properties, and it is not asked here.